Editorial- Calling a Spade a Spade
 
The last few weeks have seen an attempt to obliterate the truth of the Holodomor led by a Ukrainian President who, in his eagerness to abase himself before Russia, is willing to distort the truth about the enforced starvation of 1932-33. Yanukovych's statement, made before the Parliamentary Assembly of Europe on  27 April 2010, that it is improper to regard the Holodomor as a genocide of the Ukrainian people is at variance with the facts and indeed contravenes Ukraine's own law which makes denial of the genocidal nature of  this event a criminal offence.
 
Yanukovych is not alone. Some perfectly respectable people share his views including Andrew Wilson, Senior Lecturer in Ukrainian Studies at SSEES, who argues in his book the " Ukrainians Unexpected Nation"  that the fact that the Holodomor was an "ideological rather than a national war" affecting other areas of the Soviet Union. While I applaud Doctor Wilson's long standing support of Ukraine this statement is rather curious because it is now proved that in early 1933 Ukrainians were targetted by specific measures in order to exterminate as many of them as possible. As Kaganovich himself said, sowing the seeds of ethnic hatred in a speech in Rostov on Don on November 1st 1932, organised groups from Ukraine were encouraging resistance to Soviet power and spreading the Ukrainian language in the Kuban. Stalin subsequently sealed the borders of Ukraine and the North Caucasus (Kaganovich feared the growth of Ukrainian separatism in this area) and organised the mass confiscation of food in these areas. Balyckyj, the Chief of Police in Ukraine stated in front of the Italian Consul that the "ethnographic material ... would be changed". I could cite numerous other quotes from Soviet Functionaries but the facts are now clear and are no longer an appropriate subject for debate.
 
The law on the Holodomor that the Ukrainian President violated is needed to ensure that the truth is not eroded by the flawed arguments of academics and the cynicism of politicians. Yanukovych's stewardship of Ukraine has commenced with him breaking the law of his own country in front of the Parliamentary Assembly of Europe. I urge everyone to participate in peaceful protests and begin to work together to ensure his removal from power. We must in particular ensure that the Holodomor memoial day in in Kyiv in 2010 is not used to violate the memory of the events it was established to commemorate. 
 
1) Interview with Danielle Granville MPhil Candidate at Brasenose College who is studying memorial cultures and the Holodomor
2) Attempt to Restrict News Coverage of the Holodomor
3) Calls to Action- We believe that the Ukrainian Community has to begin a campaign to remove Yanukovych from power. These initial actions are the beginning of that campaign.
4) The PACE Judicial Committee Resolution on the Holodomor
5) Constitutional Dead End- Halya Coynash analyses the Threat to Democacy posed by the cynical constitutional changes initiated by PRU
 
The flawed PACE Resolution which contained a number of Russian sponsored inaccuracies has been covered exhaustively in the media. However the Judicial Committee of PACE has recognised the Holodomor as a genocide against the Ukrainian People and criticised the intellectually worthless report that PACE ultimately adopted under pressure from thev Russian delegation.
 
1) Interview with Danielle Granville MPhil Candidate at Brasenose College
Danielle please could you tell us a little about your background and why you chose Oxford University for your studies?
 
I studied political science as an undergraduate at Boston College, after which I completed an MPhil in Comparative Government at Oxford.  I'm now a DPhil candidate in the Department of Politics.  When I was an undergraduate, I did my ‘junior year abroad' at Oxford and I had an amazing time.  The history and the traditions are very unique, and the academic experience was very challenging - the system really encourages independent thinking.  I knew I wanted to return for graduate school, especially since there are so many experts on the former Soviet Union.  Also, people here are doing a lot of interesting research on topics like national identity and transitional justice, which was an additional draw.
 
What drew you to look at the Holodomor and memorial culture?
 
People sometimes ask me why I study genocide and mass violence - they tend to think it's too depressing.  But if we don't examine these types of events, it's like pretending they don't happen, and that's dangerous.  I decided to study collective memory because I think it's a very positive thing after such trauma.  Memory after genocide involves grieving but it's also about recovering and rebuilding, and this is an uplifting way to think about the aftermath of genocide.  As to the Holodomor, I was lucky enough to have a supervisor who knows a lot about Ukraine, and she suggested that I read up on the topic.  It was very soon after I learned about it that I knew I wanted it to be the topic of my doctoral dissertation.  It's obviously a horrific atrocity that very few people know about, relative to events like the Holocaust.  This comparative element is intriguing in itself, but in addition, in my opinion, how people choose to remember the Holodomor is extremely important to the course of state and nation building in Ukraine.  I think the diaspora's initiatives in raising awareness about the Holodomor can also tell us a lot about how history affects the expression of national identity, even for those living outside their homeland.
 
What are the main features of the memorial culture around the Holodomor in Ukraine in your view?
 
Obviously President Yushchenko did a lot to change the way the Holodomor is remembered, both in Ukraine and in the diaspora.  There seems to be more openness now, and a growing desire to discuss the event and its implications, but the focus on the past has also been controversial for many reasons.  I've also been told that there's still a lot of fear - it can be difficult for survivors to discuss traumatic memories that have been suppressed for so many decades.  In Ukraine, historical research is continuing, but it's an open question what form dialogue with Russia will take, and how the Holodomor will fit into the broader narrative of Ukrainian history.  It will also be interesting to see what place the Holodomor takes alongside other genocides, both historical ones like the Armenian and the Holocaust, but also in the context of Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, etc.  Finally, I think memory of the Holodomor has been and continues to be shaped by the relationship between the Ukrainian state and the diaspora, because the diaspora helps promote awareness of the Holodomor among non-Ukrainian audiences but can also choose its own path in how to do this.
 
Please tell us more about your work on Russian denial of the Holodomor genocide?
 
I think Russians' views of the Holodomor have to be seen in their wider context.  The question of how to remember the Holodomor is tied to other questions, like how to remember Stalin and what role Russians themselves played in maintaining the Soviet system.  The relationship between Russia and Ukraine is not the only one affected by the politics of memory - the past has also created problems for Russia and the Baltic states, Poland, Chechnya, etc.  In trying to understand Russian approaches to their Soviet past, I've focused on how Russians were considered the ‘core' people of the Soviet empire.  This means in the post-Soviet period, because Russia is the legal successor to the Soviet Union, Russians are often characterized as historical victimizers.  But there was another layer to the Soviet experience, in which the system encouraged everyone to collaborate, to become an informant and to cooperate in order to survive.  So on the one hand, to use Geoffrey Hosking's phrasing, Russians were the ruling people and thus seem to bear responsibility.  But on the other hand, they were victims like everyone else, because the lines between victim and victimizer were blurred by the totalitarian experience.  So it's this dynamic interplay between conceptions of the Russian identity - the inheritance that is the Soviet identity - that I've tried to understand.
 
Do you think that there is any prospect for Russia and Ukraine agreeing on a shared account of the Holodomor? How could a dialogue be facilitated by the diaspora community here in the UK?
 
I think there will be progress, but what remains to be seen is how long this will take and what figures or events can stimulate a rapprochement.  In cases like post-war Germany, reckoning with the past took several forms and changed over time - Germany tends to be held up as the ‘ideal' for a how a country should deal with historical crimes, but this openness emerged over a few generations.  Nowadays, the international normative context tends to favor human rights and redressing past wrongs, so this might be an important influence.  I also think there's been some opening on the Russian side in the last year or so, with the Kremlin's shift on Katyn being the most recent example.  But Yanukovych's election in Ukraine may slow down the dialogue over the Holodomor somewhat.  As to the diaspora's role, I think their focus on collecting survivor testimony and raising awareness about what happened during the Holodomor will be very important, as will the support system Ukrainians in the diaspora are able to build in their local communities, with their national governments, and with other groups who were victims of state-sponsored violence in the past.
 
I know that you are researching the campaign for Holodomor recognition in Britain and the USA- please could you let us know what the differences are between how these American Ukrainian and British Ukrainian communities approach the campaign?
 
I've just begun my US-based research, so I can't really answer this yet.  On the surface, these two communities share the same goal - to have the Holodomor recognized as genocide.  But does ‘recognition' necessarily mean the same thing for both communities?  It's clearly a very emotional and compelling issue for both American and British Ukrainians. But it will be interesting to see how different political systems have affected their strategies and their objectives, and how the leaders within these communities get people interested and involved with the issue.  I'm also going to explore how much communication goes on between Ukrainian communities in these two countries, and compare and contrast which objectives are prioritized in either case.
 
Ukrainians are aware that the Holodomor was the result of the enforced extermination by hunger of millions of people in 1933. But although we can point to the directives, the New Year Telegram and the order to seal the borders of January 22nd 1933 and the eyewitness testimony and prove that the Holodomor was delibarate academics often promote an alternative view based on a selective approach to the evidence or ignoring the wording of the 1948 convention. Do you have a view as to why this is the case? And how can we engage with academics and convince them to call a spade a spade?
 
Although I'm familiar with these debates, I'm not an historian myself.  My goal is to understand diaspora Ukrainians' perceptions of the Holodomor and of how it is remembered (or not), and to explore how these perceptions are translated into action.  And indeed, one of the questions I'm most interested in is how various actions affect, in turn, non-Ukrainians' perceptions of the Holodomor.  This includes academics, as well as the Government, the media, and other diaspora groups.
 
What are your main impressions of the campaign for Holodomor recognition in the UK?
 
It's extremely multi-faceted.  There are lots of different initiatives going on at the local and national levels, and these often seem to complement each other.  There's definitely a lot of enthusiasm, and I'm impressed by the support people within the community give one another.  But I've come across some different opinions about the best way to achieve Holodomor recognition, with some people pushing for immediate legislative change and others who focus more on the commemorative side.  It's clearly a very emotional issue for Ukrainians in the UK, but the range of different ways this emotion is harnessed and directed is what I've found most intriguing.  I also think it's good that Ukrainians in Great Britain try to avoid the ‘competitive victimhood' approach that diaspora groups are often criticized for - teaching people about the Holodomor should in no way threaten our understanding of or indignation for other groups' experience of victimization.  For this reason, I was pleased to hear that representatives from Polish and Jewish groups attended the national commemoration in November 2008, and that Rochdale erected a Holodomor memorial stone directly across from a Holocaust memorial stone.
 
How can we promote the truth about Ukraine's enormous demographic losses in the twentieth century given that many sources of popular culture evade and gloss over these facts?
 
I've been very impressed by the different ways that British Ukrainians have been promoting awareness about the Holodomor.  I think things like gathering eyewitness testimony and making it easily accessible via the web are extremely important, not only because it makes people take a good hard look at what happened in 1932-33, but simply because it gives the dead a voice.  The web has become a very important forum, for example by using Facebook to recruit participants in events and with websites like Holodomor.org.uk keeping track of responses from British political figures.  Efforts like involving students and looking at the school curriculum are also very interesting, as are attempts to build partnerships with other diaspora groups and with genocide prevention organizations.  Finally, I think the local media and local town councils are very important, because they help promote awareness from the bottom-up - these resources help create a strong foundation for wider understanding of the Holodomor.
 
I know that you have visited Ukraine. What were the main impressions you formed of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian people?
 
I really enjoyed my time in Ukraine and I hope I can return soon.  I was impressed by the Ukrainian students I met, who were so passionate about debating their country's history and trying to understand it better.  They were extremely open-minded but they also had a lot of conviction in their opinions.  And I loved the vibrancy of Ukrainian culture and of the cities I visited - there were so many layers, old and new and East and West.
 
2 Attempt to Restrict Media Coverage of Yanukovych's speech on the Holodomor
 
This Ukrainian language article highlights that jounalists were instucted not to cover Yanukovych's literally criminal speech on the Holodomor.
http://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2010/04/30/4995607/
 
3 Calls to Action
 
The International Holodomor Committee is urging all Ukrainian Communities to conduct Holodomor requiems on 28th May as the beginning of a coordinated campaign to protect the memory of the Holodomor which will culminate in Kyiv in November. The AUGB is also calling on Ukrainians in the UK to protest
 
 
 AUGB Email
Many of you will already know that, in a speech to the Council of Europe on 27 April, President Yanukovych denied that the Holodomor was an act of genocide against the people of Ukraine. In doing so, he broke Ukraine's own law on the Holodomor, which states that it was an act of genocide and makes it an offence to deny this. For further details, follow the link to the various news items on the AUGB website.
 
http://www.augb.co.uk/index.php
 
AUGB Rada will be writing to the UK Ambassador of Ukraine to condemn both this, and the disgraceful vote in Parliament on the same day which handed over Black Sea bases to the Russian navy in return for cheap gas. AUGB Rada has issued a statement on both these events.   http://www.augb.co.uk/news-page.php?id=262
 
We strongly encourage everyone to voice their own protest. You can do this by sending an e-mail to the Embassy of Ukraine at office@ukremb.org.uk At the beginning of the e-mail, mark it For the attention of Dr Ihor Kharchenko, Ambassador of Ukraine to the UK.  You should write whatever you believe is appropriate, but also request that your views are communicated to the President of Ukraine.
 
Ironically, on 28 April, the BBC World Service broadcast an excellent radio programme on the Holodomor, which included an interview with Mrs Maria Volkova from Nottingham. You can listen to the broadcast by following this link
 
http://www.augb.co.uk/news-page.php?id=260
 
Please circulate this e-mail and the information as widely as possible and encourage as many people as you can to send a protest.
 
Regards
 
Iryna
 
4) PACE- the Resolution of the Judicial Committee 
 
Commemorating the victims of the Great Famine (Holodomor) in the former USSR
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc10/EDOC12181.htm
 
 5) Constitutional Dead End
 
Constitutional Dead End
 
"Where the rule of law is concerned it is not enough to help states to adopt democratic constitutions.  There is also a need to help them to ensure that these are implemented". Not my words, although I wholeheartedly agree. They can be found on the site of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission).
Must we assume different interpretation of the word "implemented" to explain the silence of Euro-Atlantic diplomatic representations, EU, PACE and European Parliament representatives to the events of the last weeks in Ukraine? 
These events began with amendments added to the Verkhovna Rada Regulations and passed within a week of their first reading on 4 March.  The changes, making it possible to form a coalition not only from factions, but from individual deputies, were condemned from the outset by constitutional law specialists like Ihor Koliushko who pointed to the clear clash with Article 83 of the Constitution and stated: "The majority of factions have to take the decision to form a coalition. The Constitution envisages no other means of creating a coalition". (http://www.khpg.org.ua/en/index.php?id=1267783592 )  
It is important to note that there are serious and constitutionally backed objections, and yet the amendments to the Regulations were passed by a small parliamentary majority on 9 March and signed into law by the President the very next day. This step by the President would appear to have been after a meeting with ambassadors of EU and G8 countries at which only the UK Ambassador expressed any objection to the signing by the Guarantor of Ukraine's Constitution of a law which breaches that Constitution. 
This, we would stress, was no small matter, neither in its implications for the rule of law nor in its practical consequences. A new government was formed immediately, made up in the main of the Party of the Regions members, and members of this same party have been appointed to many vital posts in government, the judiciary and the media.  Serious human rights concerns have already been raised, as well as widespread protest over educational changes likely to bring back corrupt practice and carried out by a person whose negative remarks about Western Ukrainians, and Ukrainian history, are extraordinarily inappropriate for a person holding such office.  Since political experts have openly spoken of a de facto change in Ukraine's political system - from parliamentary-presidential to presidential rule, and given the previous scrutiny by European structures of Ukraine's affairs, these including the European Parliament's resolution in January, the silence now is baffling.  
From media reports, since there have been no responses from the ambassadors to our letters, it seems that the only proviso was that the Constitutional Court should be asked for its opinion. It is near inconceivable that the ambassadors were unaware that the same judges of the Constitutional Court had handed down a judgment in September 2008 on this same issue, stating unequivocally that only factions form a coalition.  One must therefore agree with Andreas Umland when he writes: "Mr Yanukovych's assurance to the Ukrainian public and the Western ambassadors that he would follow the court's ruling always looked empty - the relevant 2008 ruling was already in place, what he was asking in fact is for the judges to overturn their previous position."
This is precisely what the Constitutional Court did last week seriously undermining any confidence from the public in this highest judicial body in the country.  It would be most unethical, but also redundant, to seek proof of bribery to explain the new judgment. As openly discussed in the media, the judges are under enormous pressure from those under whose quotas they are appointed.  The highly respected Razumkov Centre describes in their statement mechanisms of pressure from Ukrainian politicians.  These included the flagrant infringement of consulting chamber confidentiality, with the judgment effectively leaked to the media and announced by the Deputy Prime Minister before it had been formally made public.  It is not inconceivable that this was not primarily aimed at pressure, but at testing the water. After all, the clear implication from the western ambassadors, Daniel Russell, Deputy Aide on Europe and Eurasia to the US Secretary of State and the European Parliament delegation headed by Romanian MEP Adrian Severin during their 26 March meeting with the President was that they simply required the gloss of a Constitutional Court stamp of approval.
Forget the substance?
It would be difficult to forget the astounding argumentation presented in the Court's judgment, not to speak of the entirely clear message from the press conference given by Head of the Court, Andriy Stryzhak.
The Constitutional Court's judgment in September 2008 which stated that only factions, not individuals, may form a coalition, also found the Verkhovna Rada Regulations unconstitutional since they had been passed by Cabinet of Ministers resolution, not as a law.  The Constitution and the 2008 judgment state that "the coalition of deputy factions is made up of deputy factions which, on the basis of the election results and on agreed political positions, have formed a coalition of deputy factions."
The argument now is that the Court judgment from September 2008 was correct then because the Regulations had not been passed. Now that there are regulations, and even though there is a clear discrepancy between the Regulations and the Constitution, the Regulations, so to speak, win out.
There are two problems here. One is the clear absurdity of any Constitutional Court Judgment finding that a law passed by a simple majority of the Verkhovna Rada takes precedence over the Constitution of the land. The second is that the Regulations do not only conflict with the Constitution, they were passed in knowing contravention of the Constitutional Court's clear and entirely unambiguous statement from 2008.  
The comments from the Head of the Constitutional Court, Mr Stryzhak during the press conference on 8 April received wide coverage in the media with all reports only differing in degree of detail. There have also been no complaints that his words were distorted.
Mr Stryzhak told journalists that the decision of the Constitutional Court to allow individual National Deputies to join the parliamentary coalition had been taken on the basis of the legal situation as it had emerged.  He stated that the previous judgment from September 2008 remained in force, however in view of the passing of the law on the Regulations, the legal situation had changed.
He did not see fit to explain how the legal situation could have changed in a constitutional manner if the Law on the Regulations had been passed and signed into law by the President in breach not only of the Constitution, but of the still valid judgment from September 2008.
Mr Stryzhak also expressed the hope that the judgment would bring benefit to society since the Constitutional Court had taken its decision specifically on the basis of such moral-social and legal positions.
"The Constitutional Court of Ukraine did not examine this case as a dispute, as a constitutional-legal conflict, but was guided by the real processes of life which cannot always be read in books or in laws".
            The last two paragraphs, quoted widely, indicate a truly staggering rift between the Head of the Constitutional Court's view of his fellow judges' role and the rule of law as understood in any law-based society. 
            One wonders whether this position, presented most openly to the Ukrainian public, is one that those ambassadors, Daniel Russell and the European Parliament Delegation led by A. Severin would wish to uphold.  Surely any judge, and most certainly a member of the Constitutional Court, is there to ensure that the law is upheld, not adapted to comply with realpolitik considerations?
            Mr Stryzak also asserted that "a deputy is not a serf. He after all expresses the will not of a political party. Not of a political force. But the will of the people".
One could fully endorse this view were it not for one major sticking point.  Under the present electoral system, established by the constitutional amendments of December 2004, voters only vote for factions, not for individuals.  Hence the logic of it being factions whose members in total make up a majority (226 National Deputies), who may form a coalition government.  By allowing a coalition to be formed, not on the basis of the electoral spread of votes between factions, but by individuals who have, for whatever reason, abandoned the political force which they were voted into parliament as members of makes a travesty of the electoral will of the people.
In a country which only recently gained independence and began freeing itself of the Soviet legacy, it would be well to broaden the scope of the above-mentioned words from the Venice Commission.  It is vital also to ensure that democratic mechanisms are implemented and do not turn into mere words. 
The words at present, one might add, are entirely cynical. Those in the governing coalition make no real effort to conceal the likely way they will increase their numbers. Unlike in 2007-2008, they are careful not to speak too openly of gaining a constitutional majority (300 votes) through enticing deputies from the opposition, however this cannot be excluded. Individual turncoats also make no pretence of ideological differences, and the press is absolutely open in assuming that money or other benefits are involved.  With important areas of governance and the media now effectively under the ruling coalition's control, the number of people prepared to openly protest over infringements and corruption will dwindle, much as it did in neighbouring Russia.
While the media still reports dissent and openly discusses the likely levers of influence on the Constitutional Court and plans of those in power, it is as brutally cynical about the motives of western governments and European institutions.
Surely the main lesson we are all obliged to learn from the tragic legacy of the past century is that neither the individual's rights and dignity nor those of entire countries may be treated as commodities, however compelling may seem geopolitical, economic or other arguments.  For those wishing to see Ukraine's development as a law-based democracy, the lessons of the last month, including the message received from western partners, can be called nothing less than disastrous.  Clearly Ukraine must take responsibility for its own future however encouragement to provide pitifully unconvincing gloss rather than substance can only jeopardize, not promote Ukraine's democratic progress.
 
 
Halya Coynash